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Abstract 
 
An attempt has been made to determine the variables that have a significant bearing on the 
economic and political institutional quality, taking a sample of member countries of IMF, 
especially focusing on the programme countries and prolonged users, during 1980-2012. Main 
results point towards a parliamentary form of government, governance and its related indicators, 
openness, freedom with regard to monetary, fiscal, investment and labour, and education as 
variables that significantly enhance institutional quality, while the presence of military in power, 
excessive strength of government and opposition in parliament, and foreign aid have a negative 
consequence for institutional quality.   
 
JEL classification: B52, F33 
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1 Introduction 
 
According to Barro and Lee (2005) while the role envisioned in the Bretton Woods in 1944 for 
IMF was to provide short-term financing for exchange rate stability, but after the breakdown of 
the 'par adjustable peg system' in 1973, it's role assumed a new dimension in the shape of 
providing (technical and) financial support to developing countries in crisis, basically through 
the Standby Arrangements, Extended Support Facility, and later on in 1986 established 
Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF; including other facilities extended during the course of 
time). SAF then evolved into Enhanced SAF, which later on became Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility (Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya, 2005).  
 
There is, however mixed evidence on the effectiveness of these programs. Joyce (1992) 
indicated, 'countries which signed agreements with the IMF had higher rates of domestic credit 
expansion, larger government sectors, more severe current account deficits, smaller reserve 
adequacy, and lower income levels than those which did not.' Barro and Lee (2005) pointed out 
that 'almost all developing countries have received IMF financial support at least once since 
1970. The few exceptions include Botswana, Iraq, Malaysia, and Kuwait.' According to IEO 
(2002), '...prolonged use
1
 has expanded consistently since the 1970s...' The fact that many 
                                                          
1
 IEO (2002; p. 9 and 24) '...treats a country as prolonged user if it has been under IMF-supported programs for 7 or 
more years in a 10-year period... prolonged users (PUs) are treated as an invariant group that includes all the 
countries that met the 7 out of 10 years criterion at least once...' 
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countries have continued to borrow over a long period of time (that is, they fall under the 
category of prolonged users) has also raised the question of moral hazard - whether recipient 
countries have become irresponsible given the apparent ease at which assistance has been made 
available by Fund on a continued basis (Evrensel, 2002). There has been an increasing literature 
trying to understand mainly the conditionality
2
 component and the impact especially on growth, 
balance of payments, and inflation, while lately research has also started to analyse program 
effects on poverty and income inequality levels.  
  
Notwithstanding the level of implementation by recipient countries (an area that is still under-
researched), research has shown mostly a neutral or negative program impact on economic 
growth. This has led researchers and policy makers to point to the need for the Fund to revisit the 
theoretical underpinnings of its Financial Programming Framework (FPP). The underlying 
assumptions of this framework are built on behavioural assumptions of the orthodox/Neo-
Classical Economics. These behavioural assumptions, which consider a zero-transaction cost
3
 
world, in particular, have come under severe criticism by both the Old- and New Institutional 
Economics (NIE) schools of thought.  
 
NIE, whose literature has grown considerably in the last three decades, thus carried out research 
to understand a world where internal control/ transaction costs
4
 exist, where property rights
5
 are 
protected to enable creativity and promote investment (leading to economic growth), where 
context of a particular area in terms of formal and informal institutions
6
 is considered important 
                                                          
2
 According to Barro and Lee (2005; p. 1248), 'Under an IMF arrangement, the amount of resources committed is 
released in quarterly installments, subject to the observance of policy benchmarks and performance criteria. This 
process is often called conditionality. '  
3
 According to Dahlman (1979; p.148) transaction costs included, '...search and information costs, bargaining and 
decision costs, policing and enforcement costs'. Also, North (1994; p. 17) pointed out that, 'The cost of transacting 
arises because information is costly and asymmetrically held by the parties to exchange.' According to NIE, 
asymmetric information (in most cases) and heterogeneous nature of individual perceptions about how the world 
works, means transactions have associated costs; institutions, in turn, exist to reduce these information and 
transaction costs (Harriss et al., 1995). 
4
 According to Eggertsson (1996; p. 8), 'It is important to note that the ability (power) of an actor to use valuable 
resources derives both from external/exogenous control and from internal/endogenous control. External control 
depends on the property rights of an actor or, in other words, on his or her institutional environment  - constitutions, 
statutes, regulations, norms, enforcement, and sanctions - constrains and directs both the actor in question and 
outsiders. Internal control is established by the actors themselves through various investments aimed at gaining 
control over scarce resources, involving monitoring, fencing, hiring private guards, checking reputations, and other 
measures.' 
5
 Eggertsson (1996; p.7) points out that institutional economics defines property rights as an actor's right to use 
valuable assets (Alchian, 1965). 
6
 North (1990, p. 3) defines institutions as, 'Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are 
the humanly devised constraints that shape interaction'. According to North (1990; p. 4 & 5) while institutions are 
the rules of the game, organizations are the players/agents  of the game, which evolve as a consequence of a 
particular institutional framework, and in turn, influence that institutional framework; hence, both institutions and 
organizations  interacting to bring institutional change. Also, North (1994; p. 5) points out that 'External change and 
internal learning... triggers the choices that lead to institutional change.' Institutions include formal and informal 
constraints to shape human interaction (North, 1990; p. 4). Formal institutions are, 'formal rules (which) include 
political (and judicial) rules, economic rules, and contracts' (North, 1990; p. 47). Informal institutions are, 'informal 
constraints - such as conventions and codes of behaviour, ...(which) come from socially transmitted information and 
are a part of the heritage we call culture' (North, 1990; p. 4 & 37). Lin and Nugent (1995; p. 2306-2307) define 
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to be understood, and in turn endogenized into formal models of economic growth. Such 
analysis, with its increasing empirical focus, has indicated that institutional change matters for 
economic growth. Moreover, NIE advocates the importance of 'intervention' for better working 
of markets, not for the sake of highlighting the importance of 'state', but to underline the 
significance of one for the other (Toye, 1993).  
 
With regard to institutions having a consequence on macroeconomic stability, Acemoglu et al. 
(2003) pointed out that, 'Overall, we interpret our findings as suggesting that the major causes of 
the large cross-country differences in volatility are institutional, and none of the standard 
macroeconomic variables appear to be the primary mediating channels through which 
institutional causes lead to economic instability. These macroeconomic problems, just like the 
volatility and the disappointing macroeconomic performance suffered by these countries, are 
symptoms of deeper institutional causes.' 
 
Ugur (2010) indicated that most of the studies conducted between 1995-2004, report a significant 
relation between institutional quality and economic performance; with some of them 
demonstrating that 'the direction of  causation is from institutions to economic performance' 
(Ugur 2010; p. 16). Hence, NIE highlighted that institutional frameworks that lowered 
transaction costs resulted in increase in investment, through innovation and specialization (a 
major consequence of private property protection and contract enforcement), and in turn 
economic growth. While private property protection is necessary for specialization, education, 
healthcare etc. are important, especially in the developing countries, where they are at such a low 
level that people don't find enough time income to make such an investment (Shirley, 2008).  
 
In terms of impact of institutional change on economic growth,  Rodrik et al. (2002; 2007) 
indicated that most cross-section regression pointed out that variables that enhanced institutional 
quality, as against trade or geography, were more correlated with growth. Similarly, Easterly 
(2002) found little consequence of variables like technological innovation (which are otherwise 
traditionally considered crucial) on economic growth.  
 
Notwithstanding that some of the explanatory variables are not institutions and that institutional 
quality variables suffer for issues of aggregation, in his survey article, Aron (2000) pointed 
towards a number of studies that showed significant correlation between development measures 
and institutional quality variables (Shirley, 2008; p. 626).  
 
Hence, given the roots identified in literature with regard to importance of institutional quality 
for enhancing economic growth, served as a motivation to explore significant determinants of 
institutional quality in the IMF member countries. The premise that such institutional 
determinants have a bearing on economic growth (an area which IMF program countries have 
found difficult to improve under various macroeconomic stabilization programs) points towards 
the need that the significant determinants are focused on in future Fund programs. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
institutions in line with thinking of North by indicating them as 'a set of... behavioural rules that shape and govern 
interactions between human beings, partly by helping them to form expectations...' 
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In this regard, all IMF member countries (188 to be precise; see Appendix A for the complete 
list) have been taken. While the aim here is to explore the significant determinants of 
institutional quality, in the light of NIE framework in these countries, special focus will also be 
made to identify significant determinants in program countries, and prolonged users. Time period 
under review is from 1980 (when role and penetration of Fund programs increased) to 2012. 
 
The main results indicate that parliamentary form of government, aggregate governance 
indicator, voice and accountability, control of corruption, rule of law, civil liberties, government 
effectiveness, openness, monetary freedom, fiscal freedom, investment freedom, labour freedom, 
and education are positively and significantly contributing to the institutional quality of 
economic and political institutions in IMF programme countries, while the presence of military 
in power, excessive strength of government in parliament, excessive strength of opposition in 
parliament, and foreign aid have a negative consequence for the institutional quality, with no 
impact of regulatory quality, and property rights on institutional quality. 
  
The structure of the study is as follows: Section 2 reviews important related literature on the 
topic under discussion, data and  methodology are discussed in Section 3, while estimation and 
results are focused upon in Section 4. The last section concludes the study. 
 
2 Literature Review 
 
Neo-classical economics, which has been relied upon for many policy frameworks, especially in 
the Fund programs, has come under greater criticism as one of the main reasons for their 
lackluster performance in terms of their consequences for economic performance (especially in 
terms of economic growth) of recipient countries. At the same time NIE, while on one hand has 
highlighted the importance institutional variables hold for economic growth, on the other hand, 
has focused attention on exploring the determinants and channels, through which the impact 
takes place. Importance of institutions has been underlined for a long time. Adam Smith (1976; 
p. 910) showed interest in institutions when he highlighted, 'Commerce and manufactures, in 
short, can seldom flourish in any state in which there is not a certain degree of confidence in the 
justice of government (or in other words, "rule of law"; an important institutional factor)'; 
furthermore pointed out that the underlying differences between countries and regions were 
explained by institutional factors (Smith, 1976; p. 405).  
 
Sadly, neo-classical economics forgot this initial understanding by ignoring institutions, by 
assuming a free-market, perfect competition basis for Pareto optimality and by taking a 
production function including labour and capital (Ugur, 2010). Such a technical production 
function is incompatible with regard to the existence of property rights and efficient contract 
enforcement (Rodrik, 2000), and does not explain the difference between developing and 
developed world (Ugur, 2010). Attention on the significance of institutions was later on brought 
in the decade of 1980s
7
, and especially during the 1990s with the realization through the 
liberalization reform, that institutions were required for incentive system of price signal to work 
for increasing national welfare (Rodrik, 2000).   
                                                          
7
 Two pioneering papers by Kormendi and Meguire (1985), and Scully (1988) brought to attention the importance of 
institutions in explaining 'cross-country growth and investment' (Ugur, 2010). 
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A pro-development institutional framework puts in place institutions to enforce contracts, 
provided an environment for culture to grow for better human capital, enacted laws that 
protected private property, imparted good education and democratic culture (Shirley, 2008). The 
underlying reason for having such institutions is basically to reduce transaction costs
8
, as against 
a zero transactions cost world of neo-classical economics, so that exchange
9
 in the economy can 
take place more cheaply with greater protection of property rights, and investment could be 
channelized away from rent-seeking behavior to one that promoted creativity, and in turn greater 
production (Shirley, 2008).  
 
Acemoglu et al. have seen the evolution of institutions in history under two main influences of 
firstly the colonization experience, and secondly, the extraction that took place. Acemoglu et al. 
(2001a) took settler mortality rates as instruments for institutions and found out the way 
institutions developed in the wake of more or less extraction (resources transferred from colonies 
to colonizers) depending on the depth of settlements (dense settlements led to enforcing 
measures of enhancing institutional quality, while sparse settlements meant more extraction), 
determined (as one of many factors) current differences in income per capita of countries, due to 
the underlying phenomena of institutional persistence.  
 
Also, Acemoglu et al. (2003) following the same line of argument indicated countries with a 
legacy of extractive institutions from their colonization experience, had weak current institutions 
that impacted formulation of macroeconomic and microeconomic policies, which in turn caused 
economic volatility; so while the macroeconomic policies mattered and needed to be set right, it 
was important to also reform weak institutions, because they were the underlying cause of sub-
optimal macroeconomic policies in the first place. North (1981; p. 20-27) had similarly pointed 
out that good institutions hindered activities that led to expropriation by either government or 
other power blocks.  
 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005; p. 953) pointed out that countries where institutions protected 
property rights more, saw 'substantially higher income per capita (i.e. higher long-run growth 
rates), greater investment rates, more credit to private sector relative to GDP, and more 
developed stock markets; while 'contracting institutions' (enforcing contracts between citizens) 
did not have direct impact on economic growth, or other indicators but influenced financial 
intermediation. ' Similarly, Alfonso and Jalles (2011) indicated that institutional quality had a 
significantly positive bearing on improving real GDP per capita. Also, highlighting the impact of 
polarization on institutional quality, Qian (2012) found it to be a consequence of weak 
institutions that were unable to control the influence of lobbies/vested interest groups on policies 
                                                          
8
 Coase (1992, p. 197) emphasized the importance of lowering transaction costs for fostering exchange in the 
economy as, 'If the costs of making an exchange are greater than the gains which that exchange would bring, that 
exchange would not take place...' 
9
 While costs involved in personal exchange are reduced by traders through relying on private means (Williamson, 
1985), and through trust and cooperation (Knack and Keefer, 1997), but impersonal exchange required in addition, 
enforcement mechanisms implemented by state (Milgrom et al., 1990). Overall, institutional frameworks that 
enforced contracts and protected private property, created a facilitation that saw investments that resulted in 
specialization, and innovation through creation and sharing of knowledge, and undertaking of complex transactions 
(North, 1990, p. 34).   
  
  
 
6 
 
of the official authorities. Siba (2008) found high aid-dependence to have negative consequences 
for governance, while strong checks and balances on ruling elites positively impacted overall 
institutional quality. 
 
Acemoglu (2006) puts forward the role played by political institutions, indicating that they put 
economic institutions under their own preferences so that the resources from the society could be 
transferred to themselves (and is similar to the extractive nature of colonization); in turn 
consolidating power, and specifically cause revenue extraction and factor price manipulation.
10
 
Similarly, Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) highlighted the impact of de jure and de facto 
political institutions in perpetuating their control over the economic institutions to continue to 
gain from it at the expense of the masses. Also Acemoglu and Robinson (2008; p. 288) talks 
about the 'captured democracy' phenomena, 'whereby democratic institutions may survive but 
end up creating equilibrium economic institutions are in line with the interests of the elite.' In 
line with the role played by political institutions in employing economic institutions for factor 
manipulation, Acemoglu (2010) points out that while the purpose of increasing fiscal instruments 
is there for economic development (through better allocation of resources), but since it gives 
more power to control the state (through availability of better taxation measures), it leads to 
political conflict as it becomes more attractive to control power. Hence, increase in fiscal 
instruments should be followed by greater political accountability of political elites.    
 
Shirley (2008) highlighted that NIE literature identified four sources for institutions being 
underdeveloped. Firstly, a legacy of poor institutions from colonizers (North, 1990; La Porta et 
al., 1997; Acemoglu, 2000), but secondly, where the country had endowments, they did develop 
institutions to extract from the local resources
11
 (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001a&b; 
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Thirdly, lack of political competition outside and inside of the 
country resulted in little motivation for leaders to build institutions for peoples' benefit at large, 
similarly faced virtually no solid opposition for building institutions that served their own vested 
interests (Nugent and Robinson, 2002). Fourthly, beliefs and norms (at times) discouraged 
development of markets and institutions (North, 1994 & 2004; Knack and Keefer, 1997).  North 
(1990; p. 110) indicated, 'Third World countries are poor because institutional constraints define 
a set of payoffs to political/economic activity that do not encourage productive activity.' 
 
The huge role of multilateral institutions, like IMF (and for the matter World Bank, among 
others), especially during the last three decades, and given a significant number of their current 
programs, especially in the wake of the recent international financial crisis, underlines the 
                                                          
10
 Acemoglu (2006; p. 343) explained factor price manipulation phenomena as, 'the group in power may want to tax 
middle-class producers in order to reduce the prices of the factors they use in production. This inefficiency arises 
because the elite and middle-class producers compete for factors (here labour). By taxing middle-class producers, 
the elite ensure lower factor prices and thus higher profits for themselves.' 
11
 According to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012; p. 74-82), inclusive economic institutions work towards greater 
participation of people in economic activity through provision of better protection of property rights and other 
features of a facilitating environment, as against extractive economic institutions having features to extract 'incomes 
and wealth from one subset of society to benefit a different subset'. Furthermore, indicated that inclusive political 
institutions are those that 'are sufficiently centralized and pluralistic', while extractive political institutions emerge 
when 'either of these conditions fail'. Further, 'extractive economic institutions thus naturally accompany extractive 
political institutions... inclusive economic institutions, in turn, are forged on foundations laid by inclusive political 
institutions'.  
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important role that can be played by them in bringing institutional change in the recipient 
countries. Every effort made by institutions like IMF would be very useful, since research 
literature of NIE points out that although institutional change is a gradual process due to the path 
dependent nature of institutions (formal and especially informal), yet the importance of 
revolutionary changes (like the case of miracle economies) have led to improvement in 
institutions quickly; along with the fact, as Rodrik (2003) points out that growth enhancing 
institutional change does not require a broad spectrum of changes, rather small changes at the 
margins go a long way in improving economic performance.  
 
Actually, NIE points out that institutional change takes place as a result of creating an 
environment (whereby, for example, reducing transaction costs through providing better 
education, protection of property rights, conducive business environment mainly through 
ensuring enforcement of contracts, improvement in rule of law) that incentivises people to invest 
in the economy, and in turn contribute to economic growth. On the other hand, Fund programs 
have been criticized for focusing too much on initiatives to reduce aggregate demand - 
curtailment of investment more than boosting savings to overall reduce absorption to deal with 
macroeconomic imbalances, while it has not pushed that much on improving the supply side - to 
bring economy to an equilibrium which reflects its true potential; in turn hurting economic 
growth in many programme countries (Haque and Khan, 1998; Bird, 2001; Bird, 2007; Arpac et 
al. 2008).  
 
In research, measures of institutional quality have included (among possibly others) Polity2  
(published by Marshall, 2012, and employed by Alfonso and Jalles, 2011), Economic Freedom 
of the World Index (published by Gwartney and Lawson, 2003, employed by Ahmadov et al., 
2013, among others). In another study, Alonso and Garcimartin (2013) pointed towards four 
attributes of institutional quality, from the perspective of static and dynamic, along with being 
predictable and credible. Moreover, Siba (2008, p. 10) employed, '"Governance Matters IV" data 
set constructed by Kaufmann et al (2005)' as a measure of institutional quality.  
 
The current study aims to identify such variables that hold significance in improvement of 
institutional quality (both the economic institutional quality, and political institutional quality), 
and in turn can help Fund make necessary adjustments in its FPP.  
 
3 Data and Methodology 
 
IMF member countries, which stand at 188, have been taken as the sample to analyse variables 
that significantly determine institutional quality. At the same time, the sample contains countries 
which have had program with the Fund since 1980, along with countries that have been 
prolonged users since then. The reason behind taking the sample of IMF member countries in the 
first place, is based on the premise that one of the main reasons why Fund programs have under-
performed in terms of their impact for economic growth, is due to their insufficient focus on 
improving institutional quality (an area, which has been shown in NIE literature to have positive 
consequences for output per capita). Information on whether a country has been under IMF 
program or not has been taken from IMF website
12
. 
                                                          
12
 http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/exfin1.aspx 
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World Economic Outlook (WEO; 2005) measures economic institutional quality using Economic 
Freedom Index (EFI) of the Cato Institute
13
. The Index captures five aspects, i) size of 
government, ii) legal structure and security of property rights, iii) access to sound money, iv) 
freedom to trade internationally, and v) regulation of credits, labour, and business. Data is taken 
from 1980-2011 (5-yearly up till 2000, and yearly after that). Ahmadov et al. (2013) also 
employed EFI by Gwartney and Lawson (2003). 
 
Another dependent variable, Polity2 (from the Polity IV dataset of Marshall, 2012), which 
captures 'political structures and regime change'
14
, has been taken (like Alfonso and Jalles, 
2011), as an extension to indicate which variables significantly determine political institutional 
quality
15
. Data is taken for the time period 1980-2012.   
 
The first regressor is openness, and a broad proxy that has been used here is KOF Index of 
Globalization
16
, which sees openness from the perspective of economic globalization, social 
globalization, and political globalization. Data is taken for the available for the time period 1980-
2010. Openness is indicated in literature to be positively related with enhancing institutional 
quality (Rodrik et al., 2002; WEO, 2005) . Although Alonso and Garcimartin (2013) did not find 
the impact of openness to be significant, KOF Index of Globalization, with its multidimensional 
approach, has been included for checking possible significance.  
 
Literature review indicates a mixed result with regard to the impact of education on institutional 
quality. Alesina and Perotti (1996), and Alonso and Garcimartin (2013), for instance,  find 
education to be highly important for improving institutional quality. Here, net primary 
enrollment rates is taken to see the influence of  level of education on institutional quality. 
Source of data is World Development Indicators (WDI; World Bank)
17
. 
 
Measures of economic freedom and prosperity are taken from the Index of Economic Freedom 
(produced by The Heritage Foundation
18
) to see their influence on institutional quality. Sub-
indices taken here are, i) property rights, ii) fiscal freedom, iv) government spending, v) labour 
freedom, vii) monetary freedom, and viii) investment freedom. Unfortunately, data is only 
available since 1995; data is taken up till 2012. 
 
A host of politico-social variables are taken to indicate the impact of political economic aspects 
on institutional quality. Firstly, data on civil liberties is taken from Freedom in the World 
(publication of Freedom House)
19
. Secondly, five separate indicators are taken from World 
Governance Indicators (WGI; World Bank)
20
, produced by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 
                                                          
13
 http://www.cato.org/economic-freedom-world 
14
 http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/9263?q=Polity2&searchSource=icpsr-landing 
15
 http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm 
16
 http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/ 
17
 http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
18
 http://www.heritage.org/index/explore 
19
 http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world 
20
 http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators 
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(KKM, 2010)
21
 which include, i) voice and accountability (found significant in WEO (2005) 
study for improving institutions), ii) government effectiveness, iii) regulatory quality, iv) rule of 
law, and v) control of corruption, along with an aggregate governance indicator. Lastly, a host of 
variables are taken from the Database of Political Institutions
22
 for the time period 1980-2012, to 
overall see the impact of electoral rules and political system. Variables analysed here include, i) 
regime (presidential or parliamentary; also taken in the study by Alfonso and Jalles, 2011), ii) 
military (chief executive a military officer or not), iii) Herfindahl Index Government (to basically 
reflect the strength/proportion of government seats in parliament), iv) similarly Herfindahl Index 
Opposition (similarly indicates the extent of representation of opposition in parliament), v) 
checks and balances (found for example by WEO (2005) to be highly significant for improving 
institutional quality). While, Knack and Azfar (2003) find the impact of corruption to be highly 
country-sensitive, still this variable has been included to see its impact in the context of the 
current study. With regard to the existence of parliamentary form of government, literature finds 
it to be conducive for improvement in institutional quality (see for instance La Porta et al., 1999).  
 
Net official development assistance and official aid received (as percentage of GDP) has also 
been included in the regression model. Although the relationship between foreign aid and 
institutional quality is less clear in literature (where, for instance, Brautigam and Knack (2004), 
and WEO (2005) even found a negative relationship, especially at higher levels of foreign aid), 
yet I wish to analyse it in the context of current study for possibly approaching a different result. 
 
A number of controls have also been included, taken from WDI and include, i) log GDP at 
constant US$, and ii) CPI.  
 
Institutional quality will be determined using the following equation: 
 
    =                                     [1]          
 
where,      stands for institutional quality, and is measured by Economic Freedom Index of the 
Cato Institute, and Polity2 from the PolityIV database.    are country-fixed effects.     is a vector 
of political/governance related indicators.     is a vector of economic variables, while    is a 
vector of control variables.     is the error term. 
 
    consists of the following variables: Regime (is a dummy variable indicating 0 for 
presidential, and 1 for parliamentary form of government), military (existence of it is represented 
by 1, 0 otherwise), Herfindahl Index Government, Herfindahl Index Opposition, aggregate 
governance Indicators, checks and balances, voice and accountability, control of corruption, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, civil liberties (where the rating of 1 indicates the lowest degree of 
freedom, while 7 being the highest), and government effectiveness. 
 
    vector is composed of the following variables: KOF Index of Globalization, and its sub-
indices (Economic Globalization, Social Globalization, and Political Globalization), monetary 
                                                          
21
 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home 
22
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20649465~pagePK
:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html 
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freedom, fiscal freedom, investment freedom, labour freedom, property rights, net primary 
school enrollment, and net official development assistance and official aid (as percentage of 
GDP). 
  
    are the control variables and include log of GDP (constant), and CPI. 
 
As our data has cross-sectional as well as temporal features, Eq [1] will be estimated using the 
panel data fixed-effects model, after deciding by the Hausman test (Hausman, 1978). 
 
Table 1 indicate that out of the 188 member countries of IMF, 129 have been under the 
programme at one time or the other during 1980-2012. Around one-third of the total programme 
countries (44 to be precise) are prolonged users. It gives a list of prolonged users (in descending 
order of number of years under the programme), whereby Mali and Senegal have been the most 
prolonged users, having each been under an IMF programme for a total of 23 years overall in the 
sample period. Geographical mapping indicates that almost half of the prolonged users belonged 
to the continent of Africa, followed by Asia (at around one-fifth of the total prolonged users); 
places that have otherwise also seen prevalence of absolute poverty on the higher side. This, in 
turn, opens up possible area for future research, to understand the consequences of IMF 
resources for poverty and the economy overall for prolonged users of these two continents.  
 
Further analysis indicates that during the decade of 1980s there were surprisingly no prolonged 
users. At the same time, the next two decades of 1990s and 2000s, respectively, saw a 
mushrooming of prolonged users (28 countries to be precise, falling under this category, in each 
decade). Moreover, it could be seen that 12 countries remained prolonged users in both the 1990s 
and 2000s; pointing towards a possible prolonged user syndrome through the likely existence of 
moral hazard, whereby countries may have relied more on IMF resources than going for hard 
economic reforms. Nonetheless, this opens up as a possible research area for the future to 
understand more about the reasons behind a country becoming a prolonged user, and the reason 
for it remaining in that category for long periods of times. 
 
Table 1 
Prolonged Users 
  
Years under IMF programme 
 
Decade(s)-wise existence 
Sr.# Country Name 
1980-
1989 
1990-
1999 
2000-
2009 Total  Continent 
1980-
1989 
1990-
1999 
2000-
2009 
1990-
2009 
1 Mali 4 9 10 23 Africa 0 1 1 1 
2 Senegal 6 8 9 23 Africa 0 1 1 1 
3 Mexico 6 5 10 21 N. America 0 0 1 0 
4 Mozambique 3 9 9 21 Africa 0 1 1 1 
5 Niger 6 5 10 21 Africa 0 0 1 0 
6 Madagascar  6 5 9 20 Africa 0 0 1 0 
7 Malawi 4 8 7 19 Africa 0 1 1 1 
8 Mauritania 5 8 6 19 Africa 0 1 0 0 
9 Tanzania  3 7 9 19 Africa 0 1 1 1 
10 Uganda 3 9 7 19 Africa 0 1 1 1 
11 Benin  1 7 10 18 Africa 0 1 1 1 
12 Burkina Faso  0 8 10 18 Africa 0 1 1 1 
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13 Cameroon 2 7 9 18 Africa 0 1 1 1 
14 Albania 0 7 10 17 Europe 0 1 1 1 
15 Argentina 5 8 4 17 S. America 0 1 0 0 
16 Bolivia 3 9 5 17 S. America 0 1 0 0 
17 Kyrgyz Republic 0 7 10 17 Asia 0 1 1 1 
18 Guyana 0 10 6 16 S. America 0 1 0 0 
19 Sierra Leone 1 6 9 16 Africa 0 0 1 0 
20 Armenia 0 6 9 15 Europe 0 0 1 0 
21 Chad 3 7 5 15 Africa 0 1 0 0 
22 Pakistan 1 7 7 15 Asia 0 1 1 1 
23 Rwanda 0 5 10 15 Africa 0 0 1 0 
24 Georgia 0 6 8 14 Europe 0 0 1 0 
25 Guinea 3 7 4 14 Africa 0 1 0 0 
26 Philippines 6 7 1 14 Asia 0 1 0 0 
27 Zambia 2 3 9 14 Africa 0 0 1 0 
28 Bulgaria 0 8 5 13 Europe 0 1 0 0 
29 Burundi 3 2 8 13 Africa 0 0 1 0 
30 Dominican Republic 2 4 7 13 N. America 0 0 1 0 
31 Ghana 0 5 8 13 Africa 0 0 1 0 
32 Jordan 2 8 3 13 Asia 0 1 0 0 
33 Turkey 1 3 9 13 Asia 0 0 1 0 
34 Dominica 5 0 7 12 N. America 0 0 1 0 
35 Honduras 0 7 5 12 N. America 0 1 0 0 
36 Nicaragua 0 4 8 12 N. America 0 0 1 0 
37 Tajikistan 0 4 8 12 Asia 0 0 1 0 
38 Lao People's Democratic Republic 1 7 3 11 Asia 0 1 0 0 
39 Macedonia 0 7 4 11 Europe 0 1 0 0 
40 Panama 4 7 0 11 N. America 0 1 0 0 
41 Mongolia 0 7 3 10 Asia 0 1 0 0 
42 Serbia 0 1 8 9 Europe 0 0 1 0 
43 Algeria 1 7 0 8 Africa 0 1 0 0 
44 Russian Federation 0 7 0 7 Asia 0 1 0 0 
Total           0 28 28 12 
 
4 Estimation and Results 
 
Determinants of institutional quality have been estimated for both the economic institutional 
quality, and the political institutional quality. As indicated earlier, economic freedom index and 
Polity2 index have been used as proxies for these two, respectively. Also, while the main thrust 
of the estimation is on programme countries, focus has also been extended for prolonged users, 
as a special case. At the same time, estimation has also been made for all member countries (as 
robustness check, with results indicated at appendices B1 and B2). 
 
4.1 Economic Institutional Quality 
 
Table 2 highlights the significant determinants of economic institutional quality of the countries 
that have remained under IMF programme at one time or the other, during the sample period. 
First of all it can be seen that in majority of the models, the two control variables, being log GDP 
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and CPI have a significantly positive bearing on institutional quality. Hence, estimated increase 
in national income, along with increase in inflation (which also indicates a growth in the 
economy) are both having a positive impact on economic institutional quality. Table 3, which 
estimates the significant determinants of economic institutional quality with regard to prolonged 
users, also indicates similar impact of the two control variables.  
 
Here, regime works as a dummy variable, which indicates whether a country has parliamentary 
form of government or presidential form of government. The estimation of regime is both 
positive and highly significant for economic freedom index (see Table 2). This indicates that as 
against a presidential form of government, programme countries with a parliamentary form, 
enhanced economic institutional quality. For example, vote of no confidence to remove a Prime 
Minister, in practice has remained an easier course to take by the Parliament (probably acting as 
a better check on the performance of the Prime Minister) than impeaching a president. This may 
be one of other reasons as to why parliamentary democracy remained significant for improving 
economic institutions. In Table 3, in the case of prolonged users, the same result holds. 
 
Countries like Bangladesh and Pakistan, among others, saw military rulers at the helm of affairs, 
at one time or the other during the time period under discussion. Military dictatorships generally 
lack popular support, and since they are mostly unconstitutional, there is no way as such to 
remove them constitutionally. Therefore, this makes them unaccountable to the masses, and have 
little pressure to improve institutional quality. Hence, in the current study, with regard to 
programme countries (as indicated in Table 2), military (in power) has a significantly negative 
impact on economic institutional quality.  In the case of prolonged users (see Table 3) the impact 
of military is insignificant on economic institutional quality. 
        
Herfindahl Index Opposition in the study is estimated to have a significantly negative impact on 
economic institutional quality in the case of prolonged users. Vibrant role of opposition is 
beneficial for keeping a checking on the government, but too much power can hurdle smooth 
functioning of the government in power, and in their efforts to undertake meaningful reform on a 
sustained basis to improve the quality of economic institutions. The role of this variable becomes 
insignificant in the case of  programme countries (see Table 3), maybe because the political 
culture has enough deep roots here to have cultured the opposition to not meddle in the working 
of the government unnecessarily; so it is likely that even when it becomes more representative in 
the parliament, it is aware of its limits. 
 
Herfindahl Index Government, which indicates the strength of government in parliament, does 
not have a significant impact on improving the economic institutional quality of the prolonged 
users. At the same time, in the case of programme countries, the more representative the 
government, the more significantly negative impact it is likely to have on economic institutions. 
This is because, just like an exceedingly strong opposition, a very strong government tends to 
behave in an authoritarian way, facing little check from a weak opposition. Hence, lack of 
accountability of the government, and little inclusion of economic agents in the overall decision 
making process, tend to have negative consequences for economic institutional quality (similar 
consequences pointed out by Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012, and Nugent and Robinson, 2002). 
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Aggregate governance index is estimated to have a highly significant and positive impact on 
economic institutional quality of the programme countries. The result holds true for prolonged 
users also, highlighting the importance of governance in improving economic institutional 
quality.  This underlines the importance of state in providing the right kind of environment for 
the market to function properly (Toye, 1993), which includes reducing the underlying transaction 
costs involved in the economic activity (a result emphasized by NIE). 
 
While checks and balances have been estimated to have an insignificant impact on economic 
institutional quality of the prolonged users, in the case of programme countries as such they 
significantly impact negatively. It may be because, given the background of overall better 
economic institutions of programme countries (than prolonged users as such), increasing checks 
and balances, may disturb the inherent space for the economic agents to interplay and to absorb 
the price signals effectively.  
 
Voice and accountability, which is likely to play an important role in enabling the people to 
communicate their point of views to their political representatives, along with keep a check on 
their activities, is estimated to have a significantly positive impact on economic institutional 
quality in the case of prolonged users; while it becomes insignificant in the case of programme 
countries, may be because of the likely presence of other channels to communicate the effect of 
this variable, in the overall more developed institutional environment of programme countries in 
the first place.  
 
Control of Corruption has a highly significant and positive impact on economic institutional 
quality, in the case of both programme countries and prolonged users; underlining the 
importance of reducing corruption practices in economic institutions to help achieve productive 
and allocative efficiencies. For instance, North (1981) indicated that good institutions hindered 
activities that caused expropriation (a form of corruption). Also, Mauro (1995) found that one of 
the reasons behind lowering of investment (and in turn economic growth) was corruption. 
 
While rule of law has an estimated positive impact on both the programme countries and 
prolonged users, regulatory quality has a positive impact only on prolonged users (and 
insignificant impact in the case of programme countries). This result underlines the importance 
NIE attaches to regulatory environment and rule of law (for example for providing protection of 
property rights) for proper functioning of the market forces in the overall production process and 
economic activity. The current global financial crisis has its roots in a paradigm, which muted 
the importance of state in providing this institutional mechanism for the inner organizational 
structure, influencing/enabling it to work towards improving competitiveness and becoming 
more transparent. At the same time, it is important to have civil liberties, as its estimated results 
(for both programme countries and prolonged users) hold a significantly positive bearing on 
economic institutional quality. 
  
Government effectiveness is estimated to have a significantly positive impact on economic 
institutional quality in the case of prolonged users. An ineffective government will, in turn, not 
be able to carry out needed reforms. In the case of programme countries, the impact of 
government effectiveness is estimated to be insignificant. This may be because unlike the likely 
weak situation of overall institutions in the case of prolonged users, the role of government may 
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be a little limited in the case of programme countries (where the institutions are already likely to 
be performing better independently).  
 
Level of openness and global linkages, which are captured by the KOF index of globalization 
comes out to be a key player in improving economic institutional quality, for both the 
programme countries and prolonged users. This is because it has a significantly positive impact. 
Furthermore, seen independently, the sub-components of KOF index in the shape of economic-, 
social-, and political globalization, are all also positive and significant for both the programme 
countries and prolonged users (with the exception of political globalization being insignificant in 
the case of prolonged users). A closer look then points out that social globalization is estimated 
to have the highest impact for improving economic institutional quality, followed by economic- 
and political globalization. 
 
Macroeconomic environment comes out to have a very important role to play, since both 
monetary- and fiscal freedom are estimated to have a positive and significant impact on 
improving economic institutional quality. It is therefore important to allow for price stability 
without any price controls. This may mean avoiding artificial setting of prices to subsidize 
sectors (like providing price support for agricultural commodities, etc.), or not allowing central 
banks to administer monetary policies independent of government intervention. At the same 
time, lack of fiscal freedom in the shape of excessive tax burden may lead to making of an 
institutional incentive structure that disincentivises firms to invest in research and development 
(and may hurt innovation and economic growth, in turn).  
 
NIE advocates lowering of transaction costs to promote investment and economic activity. 
Excessive restrictions on capital mobility, or making such mobility expensive through applying 
controls is likely to increase the cost of economic activity, with the probable result of reducing 
such investment. This line of thinking is supported by the current estimation, which indicates that 
investment freedom has a positive and significant impact on improving economic institutional 
quality for programme countries. The impact of investment freedom becomes insignificant 
though, for prolonged users. This may be because of the lack of depth of financial markets, or 
low investment opportunities (due to structural bottlenecks, like energy shortages or a worsening 
of law and order situation) in the case of prolonged users. 
 
Labour freedom is estimated to have a significantly positive impact on economic institutional 
quality for both the programme countries and prolonged users. Proper minimum wages, 
flexibility with regard to working hours and hiring, etc. all help in improving the labour market 
conditions, and economic institutions involved.  
 
The importance of property rights is paramount in the literature of NIE. Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2012) for example, pointed out that the reason why countries like UK and Netherlands 
developed far quicker than its other neighbours is because of the protection of property rights 
that led to greater research, and innovation. The current study estimates that property rights have 
a significantly positive impact on economic institutional quality of the prolonged users; though 
the same becomes insignificant in the case of programme countries. Deeper analysis of the data 
on property rights for the programme countries (that are not prolonged users) indicate a 
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worsening of property rights over the ending years for the sample of that data; opening up a 
further research area that may be explored for finding reasons behind this phenomena. 
 
North (1994), among others, has for long underlined the importance of education, since it is an 
important element of the institutional matrix that promotes learning, competitiveness, innovation, 
and economic activity. This line of thinking is supported by the current study, which indicated 
that net primary school enrollment has a positively significant impact on economic institutional 
quality, for both the programme countries and prolonged users. 
 
In the wake of twin deficits, many of the member countries have either approached the IMF 
and/or other donors to lend resources. Net official aid and official development assistance  is 
estimated to have a significantly negative impact on economic institutional quality, for both the 
programme countries and prolonged users. Further research into this may focus attention to 
exploring existence of a probable prolonged user syndrome, and the underlying reasons, which 
lead to it. 
 
4.2 Political Institutional Quality 
 
The proxy of Polity2 has been taken for political institutional quality, and its significant 
determinants are explored for the programme countries (see Table 4) and prolonged users (see 
Table 5); while estimation is also done for all member countries as robustness check (see 
Appendix B2). 
 
Log GDP and CPI are once again taken as control variables, but estimated values indicate that 
while CPI is mostly positively significant in both the programme countries (Table 4) and 
prolonged users (Table 5), log GDP is showing some surprising results in some regressions with 
wrong signs and significance, while in others these are according to the literature.  
 
Regime has an estimated positive and significant impact on political institutional quality for both 
the programme countries and prolonged users; the same consequence as for economic 
institutional quality, underlining in turn the importance parliamentary form of government 
(unlike a presidential system) for enhancing overall institutional quality. 
 
Like its significantly negative impact on economic institutional quality of the programme 
countries, military (in power) has the same consequence for political institutional quality (here 
for the prolonged users also). This is in line with the lack of deep roots of political institutions in 
countries (like Pakistan) which saw military dictatorships at one time or the other, during the 
sample period. As indicated before, since military did not come in power through the authority of 
the ballot, they on one side, weakened the true political leadership (and the political culture in 
general) to perpetuate their rule, on the other side, felt lesser motivation and/or lack of popular 
support to carry out much needed hard economic reform.  
 
Herfindahl indices for both the government and the opposition have a significantly negative 
impact on political institutional quality of both the programme countries and prolonged users. 
Hence, just like their estimated impact on economic institutional quality, in fact even more so for 
political institutional quality, an exceedingly representative government or opposition (are likely 
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to exhibit dictatorial attributes) in parliament would thwart improvement in overall institutional 
quality. 
  
Aggregate governance indicator, like its impact on economic institutional quality, once again has 
a significantly positive estimated impact on improving political institutional quality. This 
strongly underlines the importance of a well governed environment for the proper functioning of 
markets and the underlying agents, along with enhancing the visibility of their signals. 
 
Checks and balances seem to have more importance and role to play for the development of 
political institutions than economic institutions (where the agents may require more space to 
interplay and/or are more developed in terms of their formal and informal setup), since the 
estimated values are significantly positive for both the programme countries and prolonged 
users. 
 
Unlike the insignificant impact on economic institutional quality in the case of programme 
countries (but a significantly positive impact in the case of prolonged users), voice and 
accountability has a significant and positive impact on political institutional quality for both the 
programme countries and prolonged users. The institutional matrix that does not allow for this 
hinders political institutions in improving over time, since political agents (example voters in a 
democratic setup) need to be able to communicate their diverse point of views to the political 
decision makers (for example the legislators, who are the representatives of the political agents 
in the parliament), along with having the power to keep them accountable. Such an institutional 
setup, in turn, is likely to get weaker over time due to loss of interest of political agents to take 
part in the political process in the first place. 
 
Control of corruption has an insignificant impact on political institutional quality for both the 
programme countries and prolonged users. This is in contrast to its significantly positive impact 
on economic institutional quality (for both the programme countries and prolonged users). 
 
While the estimated impact of regulatory quality remained insignificant, rule of law is estimated 
to have a significantly positive impact on political institutional quality, for both the programme 
countries and prolonged users. Hence, just like its strong estimated consequence for economic 
institutional quality, rule of law has similar bearing on political institutional quality. 
 
Civil liberties have a significantly positive impact on political institutional quality. The result 
holds true for the programme countries and the prolonged users; which is in line with the strong 
consequence it holds for improving the economic institutional quality. 
 
Government effectiveness is important for improving political institutional quality, since it has 
an estimated significantly positive impact for the programme countries (for prolonged users the 
impact is insignificant). While it had only positive consequences for prolonged users with regard 
to economic institutional quality, it affects positively the programme countries when it comes to 
improving the political institutional quality, highlighting the immense importance it holds for the 
development of the overall political process. 
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Openness in terms of globalization is important for political institutional quality (the same as for 
economic institutional quality), since KOF index of globalization is estimated to be significantly 
positive, for both the programme countries and prolonged users. See separately, economic 
globalization, followed by political globalization are estimated to hold the most importance in 
terms of their consequence respectively, on political institutional quality for the programme 
countries; for prolonged users, political-  followed by social globalization hold the most 
importance, while economic globalization has an insignificant impact. 
 
Monetary freedom has a significantly positive impact on political institutions for both the 
programme countries and prolonged users; fiscal freedom on the other hand is significantly 
positive only for the prolonged users (insignificant for the programme countries). A 
macroeconomic institutional incentive structure that believes in artificial intervention for price 
stability, and a burdensome tax system, is unlikely to allow political institutions to evolve as an 
inclusive and accountable system. Furthermore, investment freedom is estimated to have a 
significantly positive impact on political institutional quality of the programme countries (with 
insignificant impact for prolonged users). An environment where controls are placed by official 
authorities on capital mobility to extract resources from one group of people to the other, for 
example (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012) hinders improvement in political institutional quality. 
 
Increase in labour freedom, especially in terms of concentration of power by trade lobbies and 
unions, has a significantly negative impact on political institutional quality in the programme 
countries (with insignificant impact on the prolonged users).  
 
Property rights is estimated to have an insignificant impact on political institutional quality, since 
it appears to be more related with the economic institutions and underlying activity. 
 
Education, like in the case of economic institutional quality, has an important role to play in the 
improvement of political institutional quality, since net primary school enrollment is estimated to 
have a significantly positive impact, for both the programme countries and the prolonged users. 
Hence, investment in learning and education, is likely to produce more enlightened political 
agents, and political decision makers. 
 
The significantly negative impact of net official aid and official development assistance in the 
programme countries (but with insignificant impact in the case of prolonged users), indicates that 
like in the case of economic institutional quality, dependence on foreign aid hinders 
improvement in political institutional quality (a similar result also highlighted by Siba, 2008, 
where foreign aid dependence has been shown to have negative consequence for governance). 
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Table 2 
Dependent Variable -Economic Freedom Index- Programme Countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
             
VARIABLES             
             
Log GDP 1.558*** 1.917*** 1.055*** 1.017*** 1.025*** 1.092*** 0.322*** 0.157 1.115*** 0.352*** 1.449*** 0.413*** 
 (0.0939) (0.0883) (0.0768) (0.0729) (0.0715) (0.0723) (0.0885) (0.102) (0.0748) (0.102) (0.0806) (0.159) 
CPI 0.00166*** 0.000654*** 9.36e-05 0.000121 0.000143 0.000119 0.000302* 0.000378** 0.000307** 4.58e-05 0.000603*** 0.00678*** 
 (0.000201) (0.000181) (9.96e-05) (9.99e-05) (9.91e-05) (0.000101) (0.000169) (0.000168) (0.000127) (0.000151) (0.000142) (0.000767) 
Regime 0.399***            
 (0.120)            
Military -0.284***            
 (0.0827)            
Herfindahl Index Government  -0.296***           
  (0.0922)           
Herfindahl Index Opposition  -0.111           
  (0.102)           
Agg. Governance Indicator   0.0138***          
   (0.00250)          
Checks and Balances   -0.0145*          
   (0.00862)          
Voice and Accountability    0.00216         
    (0.00177)         
Control of Corruption    0.00708***         
    (0.00148)         
Regulatory Quality     0.000318        
     (0.00156)        
Rule of Law     0.00903***        
     (0.00207)        
Civil Liberties     0.0795***        
     (0.0237)        
Government Effectiveness      0.00165       
      (0.00171)       
KOF Index of Globalization       0.0737***      
       (0.00276)      
KOF Index of Economic Glob.        0.0310***     
        (0.00289)     
KOF Index of Social Glob.        0.0453***     
        (0.00389)     
KOF Index of Political Glob.        0.00593***     
        (0.00226)     
Monetary Freedom         0.0148***    
         (0.00114)    
Fiscal Freedom         0.0106***    
         (0.00172)    
Investment Freedom          0.00245**   
          (0.00110)   
Labour Freedom          0.00353**   
          (0.00175)   
Property Rights           -0.000331  
           (0.00164)  
Primary School Enrollment            0.00826*** 
            (0.00283) 
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Net Off. Aid & Off. Dev. Ass.            -0.00920*** 
            (0.00343) 
Constant -5.471*** -7.789*** -1.784*** -1.455*** -1.844*** -1.699*** 0.156 1.160* -3.755*** 3.631*** -4.412*** 1.988* 
 (0.690) (0.664) (0.557) (0.537) (0.520) (0.530) (0.591) (0.685) (0.521) (0.747) (0.620) (1.162) 
             
Observations 1,171 996 874 964 954 964 1,162 1,055 998 598 998 675 
R-squared 0.306 0.388 0.257 0.256 0.274 0.233 0.575 0.607 0.458 0.056 0.324 0.363 
Number of countries 99 97 93 102 101 102 107 94 99 98 99 96 
Note all models are estimated using country-fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 3 
Dependent Variable -Economic Freedom Index- Prolonged Users 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
             
VARIABLES             
             
Log GDP 0.274 0.900*** 0.614*** 0.752*** 0.648*** 0.802*** 0.0379 -0.0493 0.556*** 0.217 1.152*** 0.151 
 (0.186) (0.233) (0.167) (0.168) (0.163) (0.169) (0.180) (0.186) (0.181) (0.236) (0.186) (0.258) 
CPI 0.0119*** 0.00910*** 0.00349*** 0.00304*** 0.00336*** 0.00308*** 0.00708*** 0.00757*** 0.00435*** 0.00163** 0.00499*** 0.00746*** 
 (0.000689) (0.000877) (0.000637) (0.000636) (0.000625) (0.000651) (0.000920) (0.000908) (0.000689) (0.000685) (0.000754) (0.000956) 
Regime 0.453**            
 (0.183)            
Military 0.0163            
 (0.0989)            
Herfindahl Index Government  0.183           
  (0.118)           
Herfindahl Index Opposition  -0.457***           
  (0.142)           
Agg. Governance Indicator   0.0215***          
   (0.00338)          
Checks and Balances   0.0223          
   (0.0186)          
Voice and Accountability    0.00674**         
    (0.00287)         
Control of Corruption    0.0107***         
    (0.00220)         
Regulatory Quality     0.00530**        
     (0.00209)        
Rule of Law     0.0117***        
     (0.00278)        
Civil Liberties     0.0832**        
     (0.0379)        
Government Effectiveness      0.0102***       
      (0.00241)       
KOF Index of Globalization       0.0503***      
       (0.00557)      
KOF Index of Economic Glob.        0.0240***     
        (0.00457)     
KOF Index of Social Glob.        0.0344***     
        (0.00628)     
KOF Index of Political Glob.        -4.86e-05     
        (0.00333)     
Monetary Freedom         0.0133***    
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         (0.00170)    
Fiscal Freedom         0.00699**    
         (0.00278)    
Investment Freedom          0.00103   
          (0.00164)   
Labour Freedom          0.00497**   
          (0.00243)   
Property Rights           0.00539**  
           (0.00250)  
Primary School Enrollment            0.00744** 
            (0.00316) 
Net Off. Aid & Off. Dev. Ass.            -0.0192*** 
            (0.00517) 
Constant 3.067** -0.596 1.028 0.249 0.679 0.174 2.835** 3.342*** 0.593 4.491*** -2.293* 4.013** 
 (1.226) (1.541) (1.064) (1.096) (1.046) (1.092) (1.166) (1.223) (1.141) (1.542) (1.241) (1.758) 
             
Observations 482 414 364 375 374 375 455 432 413 249 413 318 
R-squared 0.572 0.520 0.417 0.399 0.429 0.371 0.650 0.682 0.527 0.121 0.440 0.501 
Number of countries 39 39 36 37 37 37 40 38 37 37 37 38 
Note all models are estimated using country-fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 4 
Dependent Variable -Polity2- Programme Countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
             
VARIABLES             
             
Log GDP -0.456 1.783*** -0.00808 0.721** -0.558* 0.497 -2.139*** -3.388*** 0.0629 0.890 0.916*** 0.216 
 (0.317) (0.327) (0.341) (0.289) (0.320) (0.334) (0.385) (0.465) (0.353) (0.664) (0.316) (0.620) 
CPI 0.0223*** 0.00733*** 0.00675*** 0.00629*** 0.00575*** 0.00578*** 0.0112*** 0.0103*** 0.00381*** 0.000466 0.00392*** 0.0344*** 
 (0.00157) (0.00154) (0.00134) (0.00115) (0.00126) (0.00135) (0.00231) (0.00231) (0.00134) (0.00145) (0.00136) (0.00385) 
Regime 3.503***            
 (0.356)            
Military -4.580***            
 (0.259)            
Herfindahl Index Government  -1.825***           
  (0.324)           
Herfindahl Index Opposition  -3.186***           
  (0.335)           
Agg. Governance Indicator   0.111***          
   (0.0126)          
Checks and Balances   0.375***          
   (0.0540)          
Voice and Accountability    0.182***         
    (0.00860)         
Control of Corruption    -0.00159         
    (0.00798)         
Regulatory Quality     0.0117        
     (0.00737)        
Rule of Law     0.0304***        
     (0.0101)        
Civil Liberties     1.419***        
     (0.121)        
Government Effectiveness      0.0171*       
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      (0.00883)       
KOF Index of Globalization       0.194***      
       (0.0152)      
KOF Index of Economic Glob.        0.0907***     
        (0.0145)     
KOF Index of Social Glob.        0.0336*     
        (0.0183)     
KOF Index of Political Glob.        0.0901***     
        (0.00977)     
Monetary Freedom         0.0247***    
         (0.00465)    
Fiscal Freedom         0.00837    
         (0.00821)    
Investment Freedom          0.0140*   
          (0.00756)   
Labour Freedom          -0.0289**   
          (0.0114)   
Property Rights           -0.00318  
           (0.00703)  
Primary School Enrollment            0.0398*** 
            (0.0134) 
Net Off. Aid & Off. Dev. Ass.            -0.0330* 
            (0.0180) 
Constant 4.193* -6.084** -2.315 -9.515*** -0.561 -1.195 8.023*** 15.19*** 0.514 -1.513 -3.300 -5.253 
 (2.212) (2.363) (2.389) (2.047) (2.191) (2.331) (2.499) (3.014) (2.320) (4.824) (2.325) (4.481) 
             
Observations 2,583 1,970 1,270 1,399 1,398 1,399 2,529 2,379 1,649 778 1,649 1,274 
R-squared 0.268 0.119 0.142 0.286 0.152 0.031 0.169 0.208 0.045 0.016 0.026 0.201 
Number of countries 101 99 101 108 108 108 107 97 107 105 107 103 
Note all models are estimated using country-fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table 5 
Dependent Variable -Polity2- Prolonged Users 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
             
VARIABLES             
             
Log GDP -3.066*** 0.120 0.0828 1.315** 0.171 0.994 -6.408*** -5.950*** 0.624 -0.171 1.971*** -4.337*** 
 (0.687) (0.776) (0.704) (0.604) (0.698) (0.724) (0.791) (0.827) (0.688) (1.309) (0.646) (1.055) 
CPI 0.0487*** 0.0202*** 0.0144*** 0.0113*** 0.0123*** 0.0125*** 0.0318*** 0.0325*** 0.00738** 0.00720* 0.0106*** 0.0529*** 
 (0.00309) (0.00352) (0.00308) (0.00262) (0.00302) (0.00318) (0.00528) (0.00544) (0.00302) (0.00384) (0.00303) (0.00501) 
Regime 2.257***            
 (0.666)            
Military -3.985***            
 (0.413)            
Herfindahl Index Government  -1.612***           
  (0.504)           
Herfindahl Index Opposition  -3.304***           
  (0.567)           
Agg. Governance Indicator   0.0780***          
   (0.0157)          
Checks and Balances   0.522***          
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   (0.0982)          
Voice and Accountability    0.189***         
    (0.0121)         
Control of Corruption    -0.00748         
    (0.00936)         
Regulatory Quality     -0.0109        
     (0.0105)        
Rule of Law     0.0343**        
     (0.0142)        
Civil Liberties     1.187***        
     (0.179)        
Government Effectiveness      0.0169       
      (0.0112)       
KOF Index of Globalization       0.255***      
       (0.0296)      
KOF Index of Economic Glob.        0.0384     
        (0.0249)     
KOF Index of Social Glob.        0.0757**     
        (0.0339)     
KOF Index of Political Glob.        0.113***     
        (0.0154)     
Monetary Freedom         0.0238***    
         (0.00709)    
Fiscal Freedom         0.0260**    
         (0.0118)    
Investment Freedom          0.00837   
          (0.0101)   
Labour Freedom          -0.0247   
          (0.0158)   
Property Rights           0.0146  
           (0.00982)  
Primary School Enrollment            0.0720*** 
            (0.0166) 
Net Off. Aid & Off. Dev. Ass.            0.0287 
            (0.0259) 
Constant 19.71*** 5.181 -2.413 -13.24*** -4.570 -4.995 31.87*** 29.23*** -4.912 5.470 -11.42*** 21.53*** 
 (4.488) (5.177) (4.491) (3.887) (4.455) (4.631) (4.973) (5.197) (4.290) (8.568) (4.308) (7.006) 
             
Observations 1,117 798 542 573 573 573 1,047 1,013 696 332 696 594 
R-squared 0.342 0.140 0.180 0.386 0.188 0.100 0.326 0.339 0.120 0.027 0.098 0.330 
Number of countries 42 42 42 43 43 43 43 41 43 43 43 42 
Note all models are estimated using country-fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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5 Conclusion 
 
The current study is an attempt to determine the variables that significantly impact both the 
economic- and political institutional quality in the IMF member countries, especially programme 
countries and prolonged users. Data has been analysed for the period 1980-2012, for the above 
set groups of the countries, using panel data fixed-effects model. The results show that 
parliamentary form of government, aggregate governance indicator, voice and accountability, 
control of corruption, rule of law, civil liberties, government effectiveness, openness, monetary- 
fiscal-, investment-, labour freedom, and education are positively contributing to the institutional 
quality of economic and political institutions in IMF programme countries, while the presence of 
military in power, excessive strength of government and opposition in parliament, and foreign 
aid have a negative consequence for the institutional quality, with no impact of regulatory 
quality, and property rights on institutional quality. Furthermore, checks and balances has a 
negative consequence for economic institutional quality, but impact positively on political 
institutional quality, in the programme countries.  
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6 Appendix A: List of Countries 
 
1 Afghanistan, Islamic Republic Of 
2 Albania 
3 Algeria 
4 Angola 
5 Antigua And Barbuda 
6 Argentina 
7 Armenia, Republic Of 
8 Australia 
9 Austria 
10 Azerbaijan, Republic Of 
11 Bahamas, The 
12 Bahrain, Kingdom Of 
13 Bangladesh 
14 Barbados 
15 Belarus, Republic Of 
16 Belgium 
17 Belize 
18 Benin 
19 Bhutan 
20 Bolivia 
21 Bosnia And Herzegovina 
22 Botswana 
23 Brazil 
24 Brunei Darussalam 
25 Bulgaria 
26 Burkina Faso 
27 Burundi 
28 Cambodia 
29 Cameroon 
30 Canada 
31 Cape Verde 
32 Central African Republic 
33 Chad 
34 Chile 
35 China, People's Republic Of 
36 Colombia 
37 Comoros 
38 Congo, Democratic Republic Of The 
39 Congo, Republic Of 
40 Costa Rica 
41 Côte D'Ivoire 
42 Croatia, Republic Of 
43 Cyprus 
44 Czech Republic 
45 Denmark 
46 Djibouti 
47 Dominica 
48 Dominican Republic 
49 Ecuador 
50 Egypt, Arab Republic Of 
51 El Salvador 
52 Equatorial Guinea 
53 Eritrea 
54 Estonia, Republic Of 
55 Ethiopia 
56 Fiji 
57 Finland 
58 France 
59 Gabon 
60 Gambia, The 
61 Georgia 
62 Germany 
63 Ghana 
64 Greece 
65 Grenada 
66 Guatemala 
67 Guinea 
68 Guinea-Bissau 
69 Guyana 
70 Haiti 
71 Honduras 
72 Hungary 
73 Iceland 
74 India 
75 Indonesia 
76 Iran, Islamic Republic Of 
77 Iraq 
78 Ireland 
79 Israel 
80 Italy 
81 Jamaica 
82 Japan 
83 Jordan 
84 Kazakhstan, Republic Of 
85 Kenya 
86 Kiribati 
87 Korea, Republic Of 
88 Kosovo 
89 Kuwait 
90 Kyrgyz Republic 
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91 Lao People's Democratic Republic 
92 Latvia, Republic Of 
93 Lebanon 
94 Lesotho 
95 Liberia 
96 Libya 
97 Lithuania, Republic Of 
98 Luxembourg 
99 Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic Of 
100 Madagascar 
101 Malawi 
102 Malaysia 
103 Maldives 
104 Mali 
105 Malta 
106 Marshall Islands, Republic Of The 
107 Mauritania 
108 Mauritius 
109 Mexico 
110 Micronesia, Federated States Of 
111 Moldova, Republic Of 
112 Mongolia 
113 Montenegro 
114 Morocco 
115 Mozambique, Republic Of 
116 Myanmar 
117 Namibia 
118 Nepal 
119 Netherlands, Kingdom Of The Netherlands 
120 New Zealand 
121 Nicaragua 
122 Niger 
123 Nigeria 
124 Norway 
125 Oman 
126 Pakistan 
127 Palau, Republic Of 
128 Panama 
129 Papua New Guinea 
130 Paraguay 
131 Peru 
132 Philippines 
133 Poland, Republic Of 
134 Portugal 
135 Qatar 
136 Romania 
137 Russian Federation 
138 Rwanda 
139 Samoa 
140 San Marino 
141 São Tomé And Príncipe 
142 Saudi Arabia 
143 Senegal 
144 Serbia, Republic Of 
145 Seychelles 
146 Sierra Leone 
147 Singapore 
148 Slovak Republic 
149 Slovenia, Republic Of 
150 Solomon Islands 
151 Somalia 
152 South Africa 
153 South Sudan, Republic Of 
154 Spain 
155 Sri Lanka 
156 St. Kitts And Nevis 
157 St. Lucia 
158 St. Vincent And The Grenadines 
159 Sudan 
160 Suriname 
161 Swaziland, Kingdom Of 
162 Sweden 
163 Switzerland 
164 Syrian Arab Republic 
165 Tajikistan, Republic Of 
166 Tanzania 
167 Thailand 
168 Timor-Leste, Democratic Republic Of 
169 Togo 
170 Tonga 
171 Trinidad And Tobago 
172 Tunisia 
173 Turkey 
174 Turkmenistan 
175 Tuvalu 
176 Uganda 
177 Ukraine 
178 United Arab Emirates 
179 United Kingdom 
180 United States 
181 Uruguay 
182 Uzbekistan, Republic Of 
183 Vanuatu 
184 Venezuela, República Bolivariana De 
185 Vietnam 
186 Yemen, Republic Of 
187 Zambia 
188 Zimbabwe
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Table B1  
Dependent Variable -Economic Freedom Index- All Member Countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
             
VARIABLES             
             
Log GDP 1.529*** 1.775*** 0.980*** 0.962*** 0.959*** 1.027*** 0.297*** 0.250*** 1.087*** 0.369*** 1.309*** 0.691*** 
 (0.0737) (0.0700) (0.0707) (0.0671) (0.0663) (0.0664) (0.0757) (0.0844) (0.0678) (0.0912) (0.0702) (0.136) 
CPI 0.00183*** 0.000824*** 0.000104 0.000123 0.000147 0.000124 0.000489*** 0.000564*** 0.000355*** -1.69e-05 0.000633*** 0.00645*** 
 (0.000184) (0.000172) (9.70e-05) (9.70e-05) (9.62e-05) (9.81e-05) (0.000161) (0.000161) (0.000123) (0.000144) (0.000135) (0.000685) 
Regime 0.426***            
 (0.107)            
Military -0.350***            
 (0.0725)            
Herfindahl Index Government  -0.160**           
  (0.0751)           
Herfindahl Index Opposition  -0.0370           
  (0.0826)           
Agg. Governance Indicator   0.0139***          
   (0.00226)          
Checks and Balances   -0.0145*          
   (0.00809)          
Voice and Accountability    0.00231         
    (0.00161)         
Control of Corruption    0.00720***         
    (0.00136)         
Regulatory Quality     4.18e-05        
     (0.00132)        
Rule of Law     0.00855***        
     (0.00177)        
Civil Liberties     0.0740***        
     (0.0213)        
Government Effectiveness      0.00305**       
      (0.00153)       
KOF Index of Globalization       0.0678***      
       (0.00234)      
KOF Index of Economic Glob.        0.0377***     
        (0.00232)     
KOF Index of Social Glob.        0.0237***     
        (0.00296)     
KOF Index of Political Glob.        0.00784***     
        (0.00185)     
Monetary Freedom         0.0153***    
         (0.00105)    
Fiscal Freedom         0.00804***    
         (0.00138)    
Investment Freedom          0.00161*   
          (0.000924)   
Labour Freedom          0.00369***   
          (0.00126)   
Property Rights           -0.000668  
           (0.00134)  
Primary School Enrollment            0.00778*** 
            (0.00261) 
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Net Off. Aid & Off. Dev. Ass.            -0.0106*** 
            (0.00335) 
Constant -6.130*** -7.884*** -1.801*** -1.508*** -1.782*** -1.707*** 0.289 0.543 -3.879*** 3.531*** -3.962*** -0.0552 
 (0.593) (0.579) (0.562) (0.539) (0.521) (0.529) (0.543) (0.609) (0.520) (0.733) (0.586) (1.009) 
             
Observations 1,711 1,480 1,250 1,365 1,352 1,365 1,672 1,563 1,439 850 1,440 818 
R-squared 0.329 0.377 0.203 0.208 0.218 0.188 0.556 0.579 0.393 0.049 0.264 0.400 
Number of countries 139 132 132 143 141 143 148 133 139 138 139 113 
Note all models are estimated using country-fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table B2 
Dependent Variable -Polity2- All Member Countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
             
VARIABLES             
             
Log GDP -0.381 1.012*** 0.462 1.019*** -0.283 0.816*** -1.937*** -3.081*** 0.162 0.862 0.780*** -0.0440 
 (0.243) (0.249) (0.290) (0.253) (0.282) (0.290) (0.301) (0.355) (0.293) (0.527) (0.261) (0.554) 
CPI 0.0212*** 0.00938*** 0.00635*** 0.00572*** 0.00519*** 0.00518*** 0.0151*** 0.0130*** 0.00388*** 0.000299 0.00360*** 0.0347*** 
 (0.00129) (0.00128) (0.00117) (0.00103) (0.00112) (0.00119) (0.00190) (0.00191) (0.00114) (0.00121) (0.00116) (0.00333) 
Regime 3.271***            
 (0.289)            
Military -4.984***            
 (0.212)            
Herfindahl Index Government  -1.155***           
  (0.238)           
Herfindahl Index Opposition  -2.366***           
  (0.252)           
Agg. Governance Indicator   0.0946***          
   (0.0105)          
Checks and Balances   0.374***          
   (0.0455)          
Voice and Accountability    0.174***         
    (0.00722)         
Control of Corruption    -0.0125*         
    (0.00667)         
Regulatory Quality     0.0111*        
     (0.00619)        
Rule of Law     0.0308***        
     (0.00857)        
Civil Liberties     1.298***        
     (0.101)        
Government Effectiveness      0.0124*       
      (0.00743)       
KOF Index of Globalization       0.147***      
       (0.0116)      
KOF Index of Economic Glob.        0.0730***     
        (0.0106)     
KOF Index of Social Glob.        0.00785     
        (0.0122)     
KOF Index of Political Glob.        0.0876***     
        (0.00750)     
Monetary Freedom         0.0256***    
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         (0.00384)    
Fiscal Freedom         -0.00168    
         (0.00603)    
Investment Freedom          0.0109*   
          (0.00561)   
Labour Freedom          -0.0194***   
          (0.00744)   
Property Rights           -0.00665  
           (0.00517)  
Primary School Enrollment            0.0364*** 
            (0.0119) 
Net Off. Aid & Off. Dev. Ass.            -0.0362** 
            (0.0172) 
Constant 4.237** -1.250 -6.014*** -12.29*** -2.250 -3.604 9.572*** 16.89*** 0.698 -1.985 -2.162 -3.503 
 (1.861) (1.993) (2.234) (1.960) (2.099) (2.212) (2.138) (2.519) (2.135) (4.190) (2.078) (4.063) 
             
Observations 3,791 2,945 1,819 1,963 1,962 1,963 3,672 3,449 2,331 1,100 2,335 1,558 
R-squared 0.283 0.094 0.129 0.267 0.137 0.032 0.154 0.192 0.042 0.013 0.023 0.197 
Number of countries 143 134 143 151 151 151 150 137 150 148 150 121 
Note all models are estimated using country-fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
